In his concurring opinion in Scurlock Oil Co. v. Smithwick, 724 S.W.2d 1.8 (Tex. 1986) (at the request for testing), Justice Spears stated that “Mary Carter`s agreements should be prohibited because they relay the opposing system, and they do not favour the colonies – their primary justification.” The truth of this statement was acknowledged by commentators and proved by subsequent history regarding the use of Mary Carter`s agreements. However, we recognize the difficulties that our decision today will entail for our already burdened courts. Therefore, we must decide whether our decision to cancel Mary Carter`s agreements is forward-looking or retroactive. While our decisions are generally retroactive, exceptions are recognized when thinking about fairness and policy only dictates the forward-looking effect. Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 434 (Tex. 1984). At Carrollton Farmers Branch Ind. School Dist. v.
Edgewood Ind. School Dist., 826 S.W.2d 489, 518-19 (Tex. 1992), we have the three factors of the U.S. Supreme Court decision at Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07, 92 P.C. 349, 355-56, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971) to decide whether a decision should be applied prospectively or retroactively. These factors are: (1) if the decision establishes a new legal principle, either by removing a clear precedent in the past on which the intervening parties were able to rely, or if it decides on a first impression issue whose resolution has not been clearly predicted; 2) that the prospective or retroactive application of the particular rule increases or delays its application by examining the history, purpose and effect of the rule; and (3) whether the retroactive application of the rule could result in unjustified results.
Agreements are not valid in Nevada and Wisconsin. Lum v. Stinnett, 87 Nev. 402, 488 pp. 2d 347 (1971); Trampe v. Wisconsin Tel. Co., 214 Wis. 210, 252 N.W. 675 (1934). Oklahoma obtained a similar result by concluding that a court “must either hold that part of the agreement that grants the defendant an interest in a judgment of a major plaintiff, not applicable to public order, or dismiss the defendant in favour of the action.” Cox v.
Kelsey-Hayes Co., 594 p.2d 354, 359 (Okla. 1978) (emphasized in the original). These agreements were named after a case of Florida stilgestylt Booth v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 202 So.2d 8, 10-11 (Fla.App. 1967). When the Florida Supreme Court finally considered Mary Carter`s agreements, it found that they could distort the proceedings, thereby issuing surveillance guidelines to limit their negative effects. See Ward v. Ochoa, 284 So.2d 385 (Fla. 1973). This agreement called for the woman to be paid.